Battle of Marathon

Background Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars , Ionian Revolt , and First Persian invasion of Greece The plain of Marathon today, with pine forest and wetlands. A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle The first Persian invasion of Greece had its immediate roots in the Ionian Revolt , the earliest phase of the Greco-Persian Wars . However, it was also the result of the longer-term interaction between the Greeks and Persians. In 500 BC the Persian Empire was still relatively young and highly expansionistic, but prone to revolts amongst its subject peoples. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] Moreover, the Persian King Darius was a usurper , and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his rule. [ 1 ] Even before the Ionian Revolt, Darius had begun to expand the empire into Europe, subjugating Thrace , and forcing Macedon to become a vassal of Persia. [ 4 ] Attempts at further expansion into the politically fractious world of ancient Greece may have been inevitable. [ 2 ] However, the Ionian Revolt had directly threatened the integrity of the Persian empire, and the states of mainland Greece remained a potential menace to its future stability. [ 5 ] Darius thus resolved to subjugate and pacify Greece and the Aegean, and to punish those involved in the Ionian Revolt. [ 5 ] [ 6 ] The Ionian Revolt had begun with an unsuccessful expedition against Naxos, a joint venture between the Persian satrap Artaphernes and the Milesian tyrant Aristagoras . [ 7 ] In the aftermath, Artaphernes decided to remove Aristagoras from power, but before he could do so, Aristagoras abdicated, and declared Miletus a democracy. [ 7 ] The other Ionian cities followed suit, ejecting their Persian-appointed tyrants, and declaring themselves democracies. [ 7 ] [ 8 ] Aristagoras then appealed to the states of mainland Greece for support, but only Athens and Eretria offered to send troops. [ 9 ] The involvement of Athens in the Ionian Revolt arose from a complex set of circumstances, beginning with the establishment of the Athenian Democracy in the late 6th century BC. [ 9 ] In 510 BC, with the aid of Cleomenes I , King of Sparta , the Athenian people had expelled Hippias , the tyrant ruler of Athens. [ 10 ] With Hippias's father Peisistratus , the family had ruled for 36 out of the previous 50 years and fully intended to continue Hippias's rule. [ 10 ] Hippias fled to Sardis to the court of the Persian satrap , Artaphernes and promised control of Athens to the Persians if they were to help restore him. [ 11 ] In the meantime, Cleomenes helped install a pro-Spartan tyranny under Isagoras in Athens, in opposition to Cleisthenes , the leader of the traditionally powerful Alcmaeonidae family, who considered themselves the natural heirs to the rule of Athens. [ 12 ] Cleisthenes, however, found himself being politically defeated by a coalition led by Isagoras and decided to change the rules of the game by appealing to the demos (the people), in effect making them a new faction in the political arena. This tactic succeeded, but the Spartan King, Cleomenes I, returned at the request of Isagoras and so Cleisthenes, the Alcmaeonids and other prominent Athenian families were exiled from Athens. When Isagoras attempted to create a narrow oligarchic government, the Athenian people, in a spontaneous and unprecedented move, expelled Cleomenes and Isagoras. [ 13 ] Cleisthenes was thus restored to Athens (507 BC), and at breakneck speed began to reform the state with the aim of securing his position. The result was not actually a democracy or a real civic state, but he enabled the development of a fully democratic government, which would emerge in the next generation as the demos realized its power. [ 14 ] The new-found freedom and self-governance of the Athenians meant that they were thereafter exceptionally hostile to the return of the tyranny of Hippias, or any form of outside subjugation, by Sparta, Persia, or anyone else. [ 13 ] Darius I of Persia , as imagined by a Greek painter on the Darius Vase , 4th century BC Cleomenes was not pleased with events, and marched on Athens with the Spartan army. [ 15 ] Cleomenes's attempts to restore Isagoras to Athens ended in a debacle, but fearing the worst, the Athenians had by this point already sent an embassy to Artaphernes in Sardis, to request aid from the Persian empire. [ 16 ] Artaphernes requested that the Athenians give him an ' earth and water ', a traditional token of submission, to which the Athenian ambassadors acquiesced. [ 16 ] They were, however, severely censured for this when they returned to Athens. [ 16 ] At some later point Cleomenes instigated a plot to restore Hippias to the rule of Athens. This failed and Hippias again fled to Sardis and tried to persuade the Persians to subjugate Athens. [ 17 ] The Athenians dispatched ambassadors to Artaphernes to dissuade him from taking action, but Artaphernes merely instructed the Athenians to take Hippias back as tyrant. [ 9 ] The Athenians indignantly declined, and instead resolved to open war with Persia. [ 17 ] Having thus become the enemy of Persia, Athens was already in a position to support the Ionian cities when they began their revolt. [ 9 ] The fact that the Ionian democracies were inspired by the example the Athenians had set no doubt further persuaded the Athenians to support the Ionian Revolt, especially since the cities of Ionia were originally Athenian colonies. [ 9 ] The Athenians and Eretrians sent a task force of 25 triremes to Asia Minor to aid the revolt. [ 18 ] Whilst there, the Greek army surprised and outmaneuvered Artaphernes, marching to Sardis and burning the lower city. [ 19 ] This was, however, as much as the Greeks achieved, and they were then repelled and pursued back to the coast by Persian horsemen, losing many men in the process. Despite the fact that their actions were ultimately fruitless, the Eretrians and in particular the Athenians had earned Darius's lasting enmity, and he vowed to punish both cities. [ 20 ] The Persian naval victory at the Battle of Lade (494 BC) all but ended the Ionian Revolt, and by 493 BC, the last hold-outs were vanquished by the Persian fleet. [ 21 ] The revolt was used as an opportunity by Darius to extend the empire's border to the islands of the eastern Aegean [ 22 ] and the Propontis , which had not been part of the Persian dominions before. [ 23 ] The pacification of Ionia allowed the Persians to begin planning their next moves; to extinguish the threat to the empire from Greece and to punish Athens and Eretria. [ 24 ] In 492 BC, after the Ionian Revolt had finally been crushed, Darius dispatched an expedition to Greece under the command of his son-in-law, Mardonius . Mardonius re-subjugated Thrace and made Macedonia fully subordinate to the Persians; it had been a vassal of the Persians since the late 6th century BC, but retained its general autonomy. [ 25 ] Not long after, however, his fleet was wrecked by a violent storm, which brought a premature end to the campaign. [ 26 ] However, in 490 BC, following the successes of the previous campaign, Darius decided to send a maritime expedition led by Artaphernes (son of the satrap to whom Hippias had fled) and Datis , a Median admiral. Mardonius had been injured in the prior campaign and had fallen out of favor. The expedition was intended to bring the Cyclades into the Persian empire, to punish Naxos (which had resisted a Persian assault in 499 BC) and then to head to Greece to force Eretria and Athens to submit to Darius or be destroyed. [ 27 ] After island-hopping across the Aegean, including successfully attacking Naxos, the Persian force arrived off Euboea in mid summer. The Persians then proceeded to besiege , capture, and burn Eretria. They then headed south down the coast of Attica, to complete the final objective of the campaign—punish Athens. ^ a b Holland, pp. 47–55 ^ a b Holland, pp. 58–62 ^ Cite error: The named reference h203 was invoked but never defined (see the help page ). ^ Roisman & Worthington 2011 , p. 343. ^ a b Holland, 171–78 ^ Herodotus V, 105 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine ^ a b c Holland, pp. 154–57 ^ Herodotus V, 97 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine ^ a b c d e Holland, pp. 157–61 ^ a b Herodotus V, 65 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine ^ Herodotus V, 96 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine ^ Holland, pp. 131–32 ^ a b Holland, pp. 133–36 ^ For a full account and analysis see R.M. Berthold, Dare To Struggle. The History and Society of Greece (2009) pp. 81–94 ^ Holland, pp. 136–38 ^ a b c Holland, p. 142 ^ a b Herodotus V, 96 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine ^ Herodotus V, 99 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine ^ Holland, p. 160 ^ Holland, p. 168 ^ Holland, p. 176 ^ Herodotus VI, 31 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine ^ Herodotus VI, 33 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine ^ Holland, pp. 177–78 ^ Roisman & Worthington 2011 , pp. 135–38, 342–45. ^ Herodotus VI, 44 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine ^ Herodotus VI, 94 Archived 2022-12-30 at the Wayback Machine

Read more on Wikipedia →

Strategic and tactical considerations Persian infantry (probably Immortals ), shown in a frieze in Darius's palace, Susa in Persia (which is today Iran ) From a strategic point of view, the Athenians had some disadvantages at Marathon. In order to face the Persians in battle, the Athenians had to summon all available hoplites; [ 1 ] even then they were still probably outnumbered at least 2 to 1. [ 2 ] Furthermore, raising such a large army had denuded Athens of defenders, and thus any secondary attack in the Athenian rear would cut the army off from the city; and any direct attack on the city could not be defended against. [ 3 ] Still further, defeat at Marathon would mean the complete defeat of Athens, since no other Athenian army existed. The Athenian strategy was therefore to keep the Persian army pinned down at Marathon, blocking both exits from the plain, and thus preventing themselves from being outmaneuvered. [ 1 ] However, these disadvantages were balanced by some advantages. The Athenians initially had no need to seek battle, since they had managed to confine the Persians to the plain of Marathon. Furthermore, time worked in their favour, as every day brought the arrival of the Spartans closer. [ 1 ] [ 4 ] Having everything to lose by attacking, and much to gain by waiting, the Athenians remained on the defensive in the run up to the battle. [ 4 ] Tactically, hoplites were vulnerable to attacks by cavalry, and since the Persians had substantial numbers of cavalry, this made any offensive maneuver by the Athenians even more of a risk, and thus reinforced the defensive strategy of the Athenians. [ 3 ] The Persian strategy, in contrast, was probably principally determined by tactical considerations. The Persian infantry was evidently lightly armoured, and no match for hoplites in a head-on confrontation (as would be demonstrated at the later battles of Thermopylae and Plataea. [ 5 ] ) Since the Athenians seem to have taken up a strong defensive position at Marathon, the Persian hesitance was probably a reluctance to attack the Athenians head-on. [ 3 ] The camp of the Athenians was located on a spur of mount Agrieliki next to the plain of Marathon; remains of its fortifications are still visible. [ 6 ] Whatever event eventually triggered the battle, it obviously altered the strategic or tactical balance sufficiently to induce the Athenians to attack the Persians. If the first theory is correct (see above ), then the absence of cavalry removed the main Athenian tactical disadvantage, and the threat of being outflanked made it imperative to attack. [ 3 ] But if the second theory is correct, then the Athenians were merely reacting to the Persians attacking them. [ 4 ] Since the Persian force obviously contained a high proportion of missile troops, a static defensive position would have made little sense for the Athenians; [ 7 ] the strength of the hoplite was in the melee, and the sooner that could be brought about, the better, from the Athenian point of view. [ 5 ] If the second theory is correct, this raises the further question of why the Persians, having hesitated for several days, then attacked. There may have been several strategic reasons for this; perhaps they were aware (or suspected) that the Athenians were expecting reinforcements. [ 4 ] Alternatively, they may have felt the need to force some kind of victory—they could hardly remain at Marathon indefinitely. [ 4 ] ^ a b c Cite error: The named reference h187 was invoked but never defined (see the help page ). ^ Cite error: The named reference L56 was invoked but never defined (see the help page ). ^ a b c d Cite error: The named reference h191 was invoked but never defined (see the help page ). ^ a b c d e Cite error: The named reference L59 was invoked but never defined (see the help page ). ^ a b Lazenby, p. 256 ^ Lagos & Karyanos, pp. 109–24 ^ Lazenby, p. 67

Read more on Wikipedia →

Legacy Legends associated with the battle Statue of Pan , Capitoline Museum , Rome The most famous legend associated with Marathon is that of the runner Pheidippides (or Philippides) bringing news to Athens of the battle, which is described below . Pheidippides' run to Sparta to bring aid has other legends associated with it. Herodotus mentions that Pheidippides was visited by the god Pan on his way to Sparta (or perhaps on his return journey). [ 1 ] Pan asked why the Athenians did not honor him and the awed Pheidippides promised that they would do so from then on. The god apparently felt that the promise would be kept, so he appeared in battle and at the crucial moment he instilled the Persians with his own brand of fear, the mindless, frenzied fear that bore his name: " panic ". After the battle, a sacred precinct was established for Pan in a grotto on the north slope of the Acropolis, and a sacrifice was annually offered. [ 2 ] Reconstitution of the Nike of Callimachus , erected in honor of the Battle of Marathon. Destroyed during the Achaemenid destruction of Athens . Acropolis Museum . Similarly, after the victory the festival of the Agroteras Thysia ("sacrifice to the Agrotéra") was held at Agrae near Athens , in honor of Artemis Agrotera ("Artemis the Huntress"). This was in fulfillment of a vow made by the city before the battle, to offer in sacrifice a number of goats equal to that of the Persians slain in the conflict. The number was so great, it was decided to offer 500 goats yearly until the number was filled. Xenophon notes that at his time, 90 years after the battle, goats were still offered yearly. [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] [ 6 ] Plutarch mentions that the Athenians saw the phantom of King Theseus , the mythical hero of Athens, leading the army in full battle gear in the charge against the Persians, [ 7 ] and indeed he was depicted in the mural of the Stoa Poikile fighting for the Athenians, along with the twelve Olympian gods and other heroes. [ 8 ] Pausanias also tells us that: They say too that there chanced to be present in the battle a man of rustic appearance and dress. Having slaughtered many of the foreigners with a plough he was seen no more after the engagement. When the Athenians made enquiries at the oracle, the god merely ordered them to honor Echetlaeus ("he of the Plough-tail") as a hero. [ 9 ] Another tale from the conflict is of the dog of Marathon. Aelian relates that one hoplite brought his dog to the Athenian encampment. The dog followed his master to battle and attacked the Persians at his master's side. He also informs us that this dog is depicted in the mural of the Stoa Poikile. [ 10 ] Marathon run Main article: Marathon § History Luc-Olivier Merson 's painting depicting the runner announcing the victory at the Battle of Marathon to the people of Athens . According to Herodotus, an Athenian runner named Pheidippides was sent to run from Athens to Sparta to ask for assistance before the battle. He ran a distance of over 225 kilometers (140 miles), arriving in Sparta the day after he left. [ 11 ] Then, following the battle, the Athenian army marched the 40 kilometers (25 miles) or so back to Athens at a very high pace (considering the quantity of armour, and the fatigue after the battle), in order to head off the Persian force sailing around Cape Sounion. They arrived back in the late afternoon, in time to see the Persian ships turn away from Athens, thus completing the Athenian victory. [ 12 ] Later, in popular imagination, these two events were conflated, leading to a legendary but inaccurate version of events. This myth has Pheidippides running from Marathon to Athens after the battle, to announce the Greek victory with the word "nenikēkamen!" ( Attic : νενικήκαμεν ; we've won!), whereupon he promptly died of exhaustion. This story first appears in Plutarch's On the Glory of Athens in the 1st century AD, who quotes from Heracleides of Pontus 's lost work, giving the runner's name as most likely Eucles, although also possible Thersippus of Eroeadae. [ 13 ] Lucian of Samosata (2nd century AD) gives the same story but names the runner Philippides (not Pheidippides). [ 14 ] In some medieval codices of Herodotus, the name of the runner between Athens and Sparta before the battle is given as Philippides, and this name is also preferred in a few modern editions. [ 15 ] When the idea of a modern Olympics became a reality at the end of the 19th century, the initiators and organizers were looking for a great popularizing event, recalling the ancient glory of Greece. [ 16 ] The idea of organizing a "marathon race" came from Michel Bréal , who wanted the event to feature in the first modern Olympic Games in 1896 in Athens. This idea was heavily supported by Pierre de Coubertin , the founder of the modern Olympics, as well as the Greeks. [ 16 ] This would echo the legendary version of events, with the competitors running from Marathon to Athens. So popular was this event that it quickly caught on, becoming a fixture at the Olympic games, with major cities staging their own annual events. [ 16 ] The distance eventually became fixed at 42.195 kilometres (26 miles 385 yards), though for the first years it was variable, being around 40 kilometres (25 mi)—the approximate distance from Marathon to Athens. [ 16 ] ^ Cite error: The named reference h187 was invoked but never defined (see the help page ). ^ Herodotus VI, 105 ^ Plutarch, On the Malice of Herodotus , 26 ^ Xenophon, Anabasis III, 2 ^ Aelian, Varia Historia II, 25 ^ Aristophanes, The Knights , 660 ^ Plutarch, Theseus , 35 ^ Pausanias I, 15 ^ Cite error: The named reference Pausanias I, 32 was invoked but never defined (see the help page ). ^ Aelian, On the Nature of Animals VII, 38 ^ Herodotus VI, 105–06 ^ Holland, p. 198. ^ Plutarch, Moralia , 347C ^ Lucian, III ^ Lazenby, p. 52. ^ a b c d AIMS. "Marathon History" . Archived from the original on 3 February 2014 . Retrieved 15 October 2008 .

Read more on Wikipedia →